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It is hard for political decision-makers to grasp the enormity of the threat to American infrastructure, global trade, and current prosperity posed by our cyber vulnerabilities. Expedient businesses spend but the minimum for (apparent) protection-thereby maximizing profit and betting that the government will eventually provide security. 3 Influenced by false analogies generated by the troubadours of globalization (i.e., Thomas L. Friedman), intellectuals perceive cyberspace to be a "global commons" to which individuals and nations can (or at least should) maintain equal and unfettered access. 4 As one of the engines of modern globalization, the internet is perceived as having broken down barriers between cultures, ideologies and societies, and created a "democratization of technology." 5 That might have been true during the unipolar moment.
Currently, authoritarian governments-with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the lead--are transforming the cyber "global commons" into "territorial seas" in which others pass unmolested only at their sufferance, and to which access can be denied. ("Territorial seas" is a rough maritime equivalent to Chris Demchak & Peter Dombrowski's construct of a "Cybered Westphalia," but with several unique differences.
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) Western governments-and, in particular, militaries--are taking actions to reduce vulnerabilities and protections, but the reality is that decision-makers and intellectuals are recognizing this transformation from "global commons" to "territorial seas" too slowly to protect Western nations from major economic crises.
3 Albeit, it is true that internet firewall and computer protection companies are profitable businesses, particularly those supporting financial institutions. Many corporations have in-house cyber security. However, much of this protection consists of a tail chase of hacking and patching, and talent pool that provides the protection also conducts the hacking. Most corporate protection cannot withstand a foreign government cybered attack, which on a cost-benefit basis is used to justify limiting the amount of capital spent on cyber security. I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing up this point. 4 
Learning by Analogy
Social scientists argue that humans learn best by analogy. Several scholars maintain that "analogy is at the center of cognition." 7 It is by the comparison of a previous unknown with a known that we can grasp a new and complex concept.
However, once an analogy takes hold in the popular or academic minds, it becomes the central core of explanation and defies most logical counter-arguments. Repeated in the popular or academic press, it literally takes on a life of its own as an established (and comfortable) "known."
Simply reasoning against its premises often has limited effect. Logic without a persuasive visual image rarely unseats even a shaky analogy. Only another analogy can kill an established analogy. seen as critical of internationalism-refers to cyberspace as a "commons domain" belonging "within the framework of international law."
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The opposing reality is that not only is this "global commons" co-inhabited by cybercriminals, hate and terrorist groups and malignant operators, but authoritarian governments in some of the largest countries don't view cyberspace as a "global commons" (free from national control) at all. Since cyberspace is not a physical dimension (outside of computers, cables and routers), it is hard to describe it in terms of clearly marked and absolutely controlled territory.
However, there is an appropriate analogy drawn from maritime realm and naval strategy. Rather than a "global commons," cyberspace functions as a mosaic of adjoining, and sometimes overlapping "territorial seas."
Global Commons versus Territorial Seas
The global commons are the spaces and dimensions on (and above) the earth which are the territory of no one nation, but can be used by all in accordance with international law and political custom. Global commons are usually defined in a legal sense. The origins of the concept lay in both the writings of Hugo Grotius (in terms of "freedom of the seas") and in English custom and law (in terms of commons pastures located near villages). However, global commons can be functionally defined as mediums humans use for communications, transportation and commercial and information exchange, but cannot normally inhabit.
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On earth, the geographically largest and most physically accessible global commons are the oceans, which include the air above it, as well as most (but not all) of the seabed below it. Air space is a commons only above the oceans, which is why it is considered a part of the maritime Following the long established concept of the "freedom of the (high) seas," global commons are presumed to be immune from boundaries and national jurisdictions. Importantly, the security and efficiency of international trade are dependent on unfettered access to global commons. In other words, the commons are essential for global free market economics. Yet, "freedom of the seas" (as with all international law) has been periodically challenged. Nations have had to fight to ensure their access to maritime trade; others have fought to deny such access to those they perceive to be enemies.
In contrast to global commons, territorial seas are ocean waters--extending to 12 miles off a coastline--in which the adjourning coastal state can legally apply certain sovereign rights. 12 There is also an additional 12-mile "contiguous zone" which functions similarly. However, there are nuances as to how sovereign rights may be applied. Unlike in internal waters, such as exclusive rivers and lakes, where a nation's sovereignty is absolute (similar to the airspace above national territory), international law provides for "innocent passage" through territorial seas, also called transit passage. Under innocent passage, vessels or aircraft of another state can pass as long as they do not (relatively) deviate from the most expeditious course transiting from the high seas across the territorial seas to regain the high seas. Nevertheless, the coastal state can effectively block access by determining that passage may not be innocent-for example, to search for illegal drugs, illegal fishing, other criminal activities, and sanctioned weapons (WMD), etc. Warships are generally not stopped lest the action causes war, but merchant traffic is halted with some frequency.
These nuances make it more appropriate to apply the territorial sea analogy to cyberspace access -particularly concerning use of the internet -than the global commons concept. It is difficult for nations participating in the global economy to block all "innocent cyber passage" (or 12 A useful diagram of the separation between territorial seas, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and high seas can be found on the New Zealand Environmental Organization's website: http://www.environmentguide.org.nz/issues/marine/marine-management/areas/. Originally, territorial seas were considered 3-miles in width (supposedly the maximum range of cannon fire in the 1700s), but were extended to 12-miles (the range of 5 inch coastal battery gun in the 1900s) under customary international law, and were codified as such under the UN Law of the Sea convention.
reception) without considerable costs. But it can block internet access on those subjects and functions that it chooses. This is where the analogy of cyberspace as a territorial sea differs from Demchak and Dombrowski's "cybered Westphalia" analogy. While the allusion to the Westphalian construct has validity as concerns legal sovereignty, the practical situation is that it may be too costly for some authoritarian states to try to block or intercept all traffic-particularly if indirectly (or directly) benefits the internal economy or fosters personal relations. As in an example drawn from Thomas
Friedman, Friedman's mother plays on-line bridge with players located in Siberia. 13 It may not behoove the Russian government to interfere with online bridge, but, instead, might expediently consider it "innocent passage" from one foreign mind to a citizen and back to the foreign mind.
Yet, as if in a territorial sea, the Russian government can functionally choose to block any internet traffic that it deems objectionable, such as news or opinion unfavorable to its authoritarian government.
Expanding Territorial Seas and Shrinking the Global Commons
Another rationale for the territorial seas analogy has been generated by a growing effort by authoritarian states to shrink the access of others to the global commons. This parallels the efforts to take sovereign control over cyberspace and internet access.
Today a number of coastal states, most with authoritarian governments, attempt to claim sovereignty over segments of the maritime commons despite its specified codification under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (effective 16 November 1994). The most outstanding example is the People's Republic of China (PRC), which-despite being a signatory to the Law of the Sea--claims almost the entirety of the South China Sea, which is also bordered by Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei and Singapore. The claim is based on an assertion of "historical rights," which are themselves based on a largely spurious history. 14 To put it in the perspective of distance, the PRC claims sovereignty over South China Sea islets that are 13 Friedman, xvii-xix. 14 Unlike the attempts to challenge the unilateral claims reducing the maritime commons, through "freedom of navigation" operations consisting of warship transits, there seems no practical way to publicly challenge claims of sovereignty to "territorial" cyberspace. In Western nations, internet access is considered a commercial product, subject to only limited regulation, not a government-controlled function. Thus, even if Western governments were interested in becoming involved in challenges to sovereignty, there is no legal basis for them to "force" the passage of digital packets across the "internet borders" of another nation. Such might be done surreptitiously To transform a "legal" cyber commons into a territorial sea is a step in preventing potential U.S. access to one of the sources of its greatest strength-soft power. 18 Most authoritarian states assume that American soft power buttresses and facilitates the hard power of the United States. 
Killing and Replacing the Analogy
The analogy of cyberspace as a global commons must indeed be killed if decision-makers are to truly comprehend the future of the medium. The future is not a return to unfettered global access-unless by a miracle the most powerful authoritarian states become democratic. As seen in the South China Sea, the efforts of the PRC to nationalize rocks in the middle of the sea and create de facto territorial waters are ongoing and difficult to counter in practical terms. As noted elsewhere, freedom of navigation operations can be publically ignored (thereby lessening their public effect) and soon only international lawyers will care.
If academics and analysts cling to the analogy-let's call it fantasy-that cyberspace is still, or should be a global commons (if it ever was), decision-makers will not recognize the reality and will not take cybered threats as seriously as they deserve. Neither will the analogy help persuade businesses to pay for safeguards to maintain innocent passage.
As a first step, the global commons analogy must be driven out of future National Defense and National Security Strategies. Perhaps the USCYBERCOM staff can take on that task as part involvement in Joint Staff reviews and the strategy guidance drafting process. We must clearly admit that cyber activity sails on a mosaic of adjoining territorial seas, not a vast, open ocean. It is a nationalizing and militarizing environment of coast guards and forward outposts. The different analogy will assist in creating a mind-set that helps insure that Western democratic infrastructure does not go down with the ship.
